

Chrono

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-D-284
3 October 1977

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary, NFIB
FROM : [redacted]
: Acting Chairman
SUBJECT : Monthly Report - September 1977

This memorandum forwards the monthly activities report
for the month of September for the DCI Security Committee.

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[redacted]

Attachment:
as stated

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SECRET

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DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE

MONTHLY REPORT

September 1977

I. Highlights:

a. (U) Compliance with DCID 1/14. The Security Committee completed the DCI-requested survey of adherence to DCID 1/14. All Community agencies except State reported that they meet or exceed DCID 1/14 requirements for initial investigations. The DCID requires that the investigations cover a period of 15 years, or since age 18, while State's coverage only goes back seven (7) years. Compliance with the five-year reinvestigation requirement is being met in most agencies. The CIA reported that their reinvestigations are on an 11.7-year cycle, a level which they advise will drop as resources are now being reprogrammed to work towards compliance. The FBI reported that they rely on close supervisory controls to ensure continuing personnel reliability and do not do reinvestigations as such. All agencies are in essential agreement that the DCID standards are high enough to ensure comparability of SCI screening among Community agencies.

b. (S) National Technical Threat Estimates, 1976-1981. This report was provided to the NFIB for noting and information. This technical threat estimating guide is intended to provide the basic theoretical and factual foundation necessary to make sound technical estimates of the technical surveillance threats both for normal and unusual conditions. The guide is expected to be used primarily by technical and engineering personnel in the conduct of detailed technical studies.

c. (U) The final draft of a proposed Executive Order on "National Security Information and Material" was circulated to IC Staff elements for coordination. This was the product of the PRM-29 effort and is intended to replace E.O. 11652 as the policy on security classification. The new policy eliminates the declassification schedule limiting routine classifications to six years, makes paragraph security markings mandatory, requires the declassification or review of classified information after 20 years versus the present 30 years, and permits special access programs (compartments) subject to DCI approval for intelligence compartmentation.

II. Work in Progress:

a. (U) The Committee approved the release of our 1974 Harrassment Study to the Department of Commerce for their use in their overseas travel briefing program. This study is currently being revised and updated to reflect current trends.

b. (U) The CIA Office of Data Processing report on the update of the current computer system controlling compartmented accesses and the new proposed system is due for completion in early October. With this report

recommendations will then be made to the A/D/DCI/IC and the DCI as to the future method of controlling Community-wide access to compartmented systems.

c. (U) The Compartmentation Subcommittee is reviewing the problems of the release of sensitive compartmented information (SCI) to contractors and consultants. This was initially surfaced to the Committee by the Air Force member who was experiencing great delays in obtaining permission to release SCI to one of their contractors. Air Force has since worked out an agreeable solution with NSA, CIA, and DIA for the timely release of SCI; but it was agreed that this problem should be re-examined in order to overcome a possible future recurrence.